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Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
Comments on "On Conjoint Analysis 
and Quantal Choice Models" 
Two points touched upon in the Madansky paper (this issue) could use 
elaboration, and a third point needs to be introduced. The first point is 
sufficiently obvious to those who work on the theoretical aspects of 
measurement theory, but perhaps it is not so obvious to those with 
applied proclivities. 
Sometimes, users of conjoint analysis criticize economics for as- 
suming too much. As it turns out, the use of conjoint analysis presup- 
poses the applicability of all the assumptions typical of economic 
preference theory and then some. Typically, economists assume no 
more than the existence of a complete, transitive preference relation 
over the "bundles" (to use Madansky's terminology). A random vari- 
able signifying some unobserved or perhaps unmeasured and impossi- 
ble to control "influences" can be added to deal with the obvious 
problems of inconsistent subject choices. 
Since conjoint analysis assumes the existence of a utility function 
(for the additive case) U(i1, . . . , in) = V(01,i) + V(n,in), the theory 
automatically presupposes everything found in the typical economic 
theoretic model. The level surfaces of U(i1, . . , in) simply trace out the 
indifference curves which have the additional property now (by virtue 
of conjoint theory) of being straight lines. 
Thus those who apply conjoint analysis and criticize economic 
theory are not claiming that economic theory assumes too much. The 
implicit criticism these scholars have of economics is that it assumes 
too little. The added assumptions and not the lack of assumptions 
induce testable propositions and predictions. It is in this same spirit of 
adding structure to the traditional model and not discarding it that the 
quantal models were developed. 
The second point that should be emphasized pertains to the nature of 
utility. All of these theories are ordinal in the economics sense of the 
term. Notice that if f(.) is a positive monotone transformation and if 
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U(i,... ., in) is the utility function resulting from the conjoint analysis, 
thenfJU(i1, .. , in)] is also a utility function in the sense that it captures 
all relevant aspects of the underlying preference. Thus U(- *) is ordinal. 
The individual "component" functions V(j,ij) when viewed ordinally 
are interpreted within the "marginal rate of substitution" formula 
V(j,x) - V(jx - 1) 
V(j',x') - V(j',x' - 1) 
With this interpretation (except for discreteness) the conjoint model 
can be seen as a special case of ordinal economic preference theory. 
Similarly, the quantal choice model can be stated within an ordinal 
framework. Thus, except for a vehicle to avoid the cumbersome ana- 
lytics of ordinal theory, cardinal utility (in the economist's sense) is 
unnecessary. 
The final point is with reference to the "preference reversal" 
phenomenon, which on our interpretation is inconsistent with the basic 
assumptions of both conjoint analysis and quantal choice. Many indi- 
viduals will express a preference for one "bundle" in a pair but then 
exhibit a systematic tendency (see Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; 
Grether and Plott 1979) to place a higher monetary value on the other 
"bundle." This type of "intransitivity" cannot be incorporated in 
either model. Thus even though conjoint analysis and quantal choice 
models may be very useful, they are both "wrong" in a basic theoreti- 
cal sense. The interesting question then becomes not "Which is right?" 
but instead "Why do they work at all?" 
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